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ABSTRACT 
With the high level of interest in patent monetization and its effects 
on US companies, data on the topic is increasingly important. This study 
examines one aspect of the topic, focusing on the effects of the rising patent 
monetization market on startup companies. The study provides one of the 
rare glimpses of monetization activity outside of lawsuits. It provides both 
quantitative and qualitative information on the startup community’s 
experience with and perspectives on patent demands. Among other issues, 
the study tests a narrative that has circulated suggesting that patent 
monetization creates for venture capital investment. According to the 
theory, venture capitalists will be attracted to the possibility of monetizing a 
startup company’s patents if the company fails, and this attraction spurs 
investment. The study tests that narrative through the eyes of the venture-
backed community itself.  
Results include the following: When making funding decisions, the 
vast majority of venture capitalists do not consider the potential for selling 
to assertion entities if the company fails. Thus, patent monetization does not 
appear to provide investment incentives. In addition, both the companies 
and the venture capitalists overwhelming believe that patent demands are 
having a negative impact on the startup community, and all or most of the 
demands they experience are coming from those whose core activity 
involves licensing or litigating patents. The effects of these demands are 
described in terms including the specific costs expended by the companies 
and the distraction to management, engineers, and other employees. Most 
important, participants detail the human toll that patent demands have had 
on entrepreneurs. 
                                                
* Professor of Law, Harry & Lillian Hastings Chair and Director of the Institute for 
Innovation Law at the University of California Hastings College of the Law. This work 
was supported by the University of California Hastings Institute for Innovation Law. No 
corporation or other entity outside of UC Hastings provides more than 10% of the 
Institute’s funding. The National Venture Capital Association has provided no funding for 
this or any other work conducted by the author. I am grateful to Colleen Chien, Jennifer 
Dowling, Ira Ehrenpreis, Osagie Obasagie, Carolyn Spencer, and Kelly Stone for their 
suggestions on the design of the study. I also wish to thank Sara Jeruss, David Schwartz 
and Michael Risch for their comments on the results, as well as Alice Armitage, Kristy 
Brady, Jake Wexler, and Josh Wolf for their invaluable research assistance. 
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I. OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY 
 This article presents the results of a study conducted on the topic of 
patent demands against venture-backed startups. The study was conducted 
through the members of the National Venture Capital Association and their 
portfolio companies.1 The article details responses from more than 200 
venture capitalists and their portfolio companies. Results include 
                                                
1 This study was conducted by a law professor and was supported by the professor’s 
academic institute.  See author’s note. 
2
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss2/1
 PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES 
238 
quantitative information on the frequency of patent demands,2 the 
percentage of demands that came from those whose core business involves 
licensing or litigation patents, the costs of responding to demands, the 
possibility of demands timed in relation to funding, and the distribution of 
demands in different industry sectors. 
Results also include the respondent’s views on whether patent 
demands are a significant problem in the sector, whether venture capitalists 
consider the possibility of selling patents in determining whether to invest 
in a company, and whether venture capitalists would be deterred by patent 
demands against a company they were considering adding to their portfolio.  
Finally, the article provides qualitative information on the effects of patent 
demands on the lives of venture-backed startup companies—documenting 
both the human and the economic costs of patent demands. 
A. Background on Modern Patent Monetization 
Patent monetization has existed in some form since at least the 19th 
century. In recent years, however, the market for patent trading and patent 
assertion has expanded dramatically, growing both in scope and in the level 
of sophistication.  As a result, the percentage of patent lawsuits filed by 
those who do not make products has increased dramatically from roughly 
25% in 2007 to almost 60% in 2012.3  In other words, as of 2012 the 
majority of patent lawsuits are filed by those whose core business involves 
licensing and litigating patents as opposed to making products.  
Before the rise of the today’s patent assertion market, most patent 
litigation operated more as a tool of last resort which was primarily used by 
companies that created their own products against other companies that also 
created products.  In this context, the threat of litigation ensured a form of 
mutually assured destruction.  For example, if one product company 
launched its patents against a competitor, the target company would wield 
its own set of patents in retaliation, putting the original company’s products 
at risk.  The tendency toward risk aversion, acted as a limiting factor on 
patent demands and patent lawsuits. 
                                                
2 For purposes of this study, “patent demands” include letters indicating that the recipient 
may be infringing a patent and demanding a license fee, threats of litigation, or lawsuits. 
3 See Robin Feldman, Tom Ewing & Sara Jeruss, The AIA 500 Expanded: The Effects of 
Patent Monetization Entities, 18 UCLA J.L. & TECH.  1 (2013); see also Colleen V. Chien, 
Patent Assertion Entities, Presentation to the DOJ/FTC Hearing on PAEs (Dec. 10, 2012) 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2187314 (using data from RPX 
Corporation and concluding that the percentage of litigation by non-practicing entities in 
2012 has reached 62%). 
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In today’s patent assertion market, however, entities that do not 
make products use litigation as a profit-generating weapon, often relying on 
a product company’s fear of the high costs and risks of patent litigation to 
encourage settlements.  The complexity and uncertainty of the patent 
system tends to work in favor of those who do not make products. For 
example, it is tremendously difficult to know what the language of a patent 
covers, and it can cost as much as $6 million to find out through a patent 
lawsuit.  When a patent holder brandishes numerous patents at once, this 
cost and complexity can multiply.  Moreover, if a product company 
challenges the patent and loses, the company could face enormous damages 
and litigation costs, as well as the possibility that its product could be shut 
down entirely.  A rational company, therefore, may choose the less 
expensive option of settlement—still a bitter pill to swallow, but one that 
tastes far better than the costs and risks of litigation. 
 The cumulative impact of patent assertion in its various forms is 
staggering.  Although difficult to measure with any accuracy, scholars have 
estimated that patent assertion by monetizers cost U.S. companies $29 
billion in 2011 alone.4 These estimates suggest that only 20% of that cost 
flows back to innovation, either to outside inventors or to any internal 
research and development by monetizers.5  
Other scholars have considered different aspects of patent assertion 
and monetization. Professor Brian Love has determined that non-practicing 
entities (one of many terms for those who do not make products) file more 
than twice as many lawsuits per patent as product companies and sue more 
than four times as many alleged infringers per patent.6  Others have found 
evidence that patent monetization lawsuits are directed most frequently at 
companies in the Internet and technology sectors. In particular, Professors 
Allison, Tiller, Zyontz, and Bligh have examined internet-related patents 
and non-internet-related patents, concluding that the internet-related patents 
have been litigated 7.5 to 9.5 times more frequently than patents not related 
to the Internet.7  Professor David Schwartz has noted that costs differ 
between plaintiffs and defendants in certain types of patent lawsuits, which 
he attributes to the fact that non-practicing entities can keep costs low by 
having few documents to discover, moving to trial sparingly, and avoiding 
                                                
4 See James E. Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2014). 
5 See id. 
6 Brian J. Love, An Empiricial Study of Patent Litigation Timing: Could A Patent Term 
Reduction Decimate Trolls Without Harming Innovators? (Santa Clara Univ. School of 
Law, Working Paper No. 1917709, 2011-12). 
7 John R. Allison et al., Patent Litigation and the Internet, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 6 
(2012). 
4
Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss2/1
 PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES 
240 
bringing motions in court. 8 Professor Michael Risch studied the 10 most 
litigious non-practicing entities and concluded that most of the patents 
asserted in the sample originated from product companies.9 Others have 
looked at “sport of kings” patent suits, involving companies with more than 
$100 million in revenue, and still others have examined patent suits 
between smaller entities.10 
Of particular interest, Professor Colleen Chien has recently studied 
startups and patenting, including interviews with patent litigators, large-
company patent attorneys, venture capitalist, and startups.11  Although the 
work has focused particularly on experiences with non-practicing entities, 
Chien also examined views on obtaining patents and interactions with larger 
product companies. Her conclusions include that only 5% of startups in the 
sample had sold patents to non-practicing entities, that small companies are 
vulnerable targets when—because of a lack of leverage—they pay nuisance 
settlements regardless of the merits, that small companies are often targets 
of patent suits because they are users of technology, and that costs are 
highest for startups when the primary response involves fighting in court.12 
Where aspects of Chien’s examination can be compared to the work of this 
study, the results will be described below. 
The problem of patent monetization also has attracted increasing 
attention from the press and companies in many sectors.  Technology 
companies have led the way, with active lobbying campaigns in the United 
States as well as in Europe.13  This is not surprising, given that modern 
patent trolling has had perhaps the largest impact on technology-heavy 
                                                
8 David Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. 
L. REV. 335 (2012). 
9 See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457 (2012). The list was 
provided by PatentFreedom, which identifies itself as offering subscriptions and services to 
help operating companies and law firms manage NPE risk more effectively. See 
https://www.google.com/search?q=PatentFreedom&aq=f&oq=pat&aqs=chrome.0.59j57j
60l3j61.1323&sourceid=chrome&ie=UTF-8. 
10 See Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, Report from the New America 
Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, http://ssrn.com/abstract=2146251 (citing 
GWENDOLYN BALL & JAY KESAN, TRANSACTION COSTS AND TROLLS: INDIVIDUAL 
INVENTORS, SMALL FIRMS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN PATENT LITIGATION 13 (2009); Colleen 
V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the 
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571 (2009)).  
11 Different aspects of Chien’s work on patents and startups are available in two locations: 
Chien, Patent Assertion Entities, supra note 3, and Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, 
supra note 10.  
12 See id. 
13 Letter from adidas. AG, et al. to Preparatory Committee, Unified Patent Court, Member 
States of the European Union (Sept. 26, 2013), 
http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/business/26trolls-letter.pdf.  
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industries such as software, smartphones, and computers. Others have 
joined the chorus of complaints, including coffee shops, hotels, and retail 
outlets large and small.  Furthermore, the research below suggests that 
patent monetization is beginning to expand beyond the tech industry, 
entering the life sciences arena. In short, patent monetization is a complex 
and troubling problem that is reaching into a variety of sectors, although the 
primary impact continues to be felt in technology.   
In response, legislators and regulators at both the state and federal 
level have begin exploring solutions to the problem. A variety of bills have 
been introduced in Congress, including an extensive reform bill introduced 
by Congressman Goodlatte, Chairman of the House Judiciary Committee.  
The bill was passed by the House of Representatives in December of 
2013.14 Furthermore, a bill empowering the Federal Trade Commission to 
combat aggressive patent assertion was introduced in the Senate by 
Senators McCaskill and Rockefeller.15 The Federal Trade Commission 
itself, which held a joint workshop on patent monetization with the 
Department of Justice in December of 2012, voted in the fall of 2013 to 
initiate a broad-ranging economic investigation into 25 patent assertion 
entities.16  In addition, the White House issued a report on patent assertion 
in the summer of 2013, along with a series of executive orders.17 In 
response to those orders, as well as workshops held on the topic, the Patent 
and Trademark Office has begun exploring sunshine rules for disclosure of 
patent ownership.  State legislators and attorneys general have joined in, 
taking actions against monetizers who have targeted companies in their 
jurisdiction.18 Even the Supreme Court has agreed to hear several cases 
peripherally related to the topic.19 
                                                
14 Innovation Act, H.R. 3309, 113th Cong. (2013) (a bipartisan bill aimed at combating 
abusive patent litigation).  
15 Transparency in Assertion of Patents Act, S. 2049, 113th Cong. (2014) (aimed at curbing 
unfair and deceptive practices arising in connection with the assertion of patents). 
16 See FTC, Agency Information Collection Activities; Proposed Collection; Comment 
Request, 78 FR 61,352 (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.ftc.gov/os/fedreg/2013/10/131003agencyinfofrn.pdf.  
17 See EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION (June 2013), 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/patent_report.pdf. 
18 In February of 2014, forty-two attorneys general signed a letter to Congress supporting 
federal patent reform legislation.  Many states have also begun creating causes of action 
against patent trolls under state law.  Vermont has been one of the leaders in this area: the 
Vermont state legislature passed a bill, Bad Faith Assertions of Patent Infringements, H.B. 
299, to be codified at VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, §§ 4195-4199 (2013).  In addition, the 
Vermont Attorney General filed a complaint against MPHJ Technology, alleging that 
MPHJ engaged in unfair and deceptive practices when it sent letters threatening patent 
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With the high level of interest in patent monetization and its effects 
on US companies, data on the topic is increasingly important. This study is 
intended to examine a small corner of the question and to test narratives 
about startups and the rising patent monetization market. With this goal in 
mind, the study examines patent demands against startup companies 
through the experiences of venture capitalists and their portfolio companies. 
In particular, the study tests a narrative that has circulated suggesting that 
patent monetization creates incentives for venture capital investment.20 The 
study tests this narrative through the eyes of the venture-backed community 
itself, and examines the community’s general experiences with and 
perspectives on patent demands in general. 
B. Key Study Results 
Key results of the study are the following: 
 
• 70% of the venture capitalists have portfolio companies that 
have received patent demands, and roughly one in three 
startup companies report receiving patent demands. 
 
• Although 70% of the venture capitalists have experienced 
demands in the information technology sector, 30% also 
have experienced demands in the life science sector. 
 
• The vast majority of patent demands against the startup 
companies come from entities that license or litigate patents 
as their core activity. (Specifically, 59% of the venture 
                                                                                                                       
litigation to small businesses and non-profits in the state. The Oregon Senate passed S.B. 
1540 (Feb. 19, 2014) (making patent trolling a violation of the state’s Unlawful Trade 
Practices Act).  In Wisconsin, the legislature passed S.B. 498 (Mar. 21, 2014) (making it a 
crime to send patent-licensing demand letters that contain false or misleading information).  
In New York, the state Attorney General entered into a settlement with MPHJ (restricting 
the patent assertions activities within the state of New York). 
19 Icon Health & Fitness, Inc. v. Octane Fitness, LLC, 496 F. App’x 57 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted sub nom Octane Fitness, LLC v. Icon Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 49 
(2013); Highmark, Inc. v. Allcare Health Mgmt. Sys., Inc., 687 F.3d 1300 (Fed. Cir. 2012), 
cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 48 (2013); CLS Bank Int’l v. Alice Corp. Pty 717 F.3d 1269 (Fed. 
Cir. 2013), cert. granted 134 S. Ct. 734 (2013). 
20 See Edith Ramirez, Chairwoman, FTC, Opening Remarks, Competition Law & Patent 
Assertion Entities: What Antitrust Enforcers Can Do, (June 20, 2013) (suggesting, in a list 
of positive attributes of patent assertion entities, that such entities, “can make it easier for a 
failed start-up to monetize its patents, providing some insurance for venture capitalists”), 
available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ramirez/130620paespeech.pdf.   
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capitalists and 66% of the startup companies reported that all 
or most demands come from such entities.) 
 
• 74% of the venture capitalists and 58% of the startup 
companies report that patent demands had a significant 
impact on a company. (Details of those impacts and 
associated costs are described below); 
 
• According to the vast majority of both the venture capitalists 
and the startup companies, the costs of preparing for and 
defending against patent demands exceed $50,000 per 
company, with a number of companies reporting costs in the 
millions of dollars. 
 
• 64% of venture capitalists disagree with the statement, “as a 
venture capitalist, I consider the potential for selling patents 
to patent assertion entities if the companies fail.” 
 
• When asked whether they see patent assertion as positive for 
startups and the startup community, 72% of venture 
capitalists disagree. 
 
• 100% of venture capitalists indicate that if a company had an 
existing patent demand against it, they might refrain from 
investing. Roughly half indicate that it would be a major 
deterrent on its face, and the other half indicate that they 
might refrain, depending on the circumstances.  
 
Finally, to paraphrase one venture capitalist who summed up the 
impact of patent demands on venture-backed companies in a particularly 
cogent fashion: When companies spend money protecting their intellectual 
property position, they are not expanding; and when companies spend time 
thinking about patent demands, they are not inventing.21  
 
                                                
21 The venture capitalist’s direct quotation from the study comments is the following: 
“More spend [sic] to protect IP position, not necessarily expand. Thinking about trolls 
asserting not about inventing.” 
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C. Choosing Terms and Points of Measurement: A Politically 
Charged Endeavor 
An initial question in any survey involves the terms to use and the 
issues to be measured. As concerns have escalated over the problem of 
patent trolling, everyone has scrambled to define terms. In this highly 
charged atmosphere, no one wants to be branded a bad guy, and if patent 
trolls are bad guys, everyone wants the definition to point somewhere else. 
And, indeed, numerous definitions—and variations of those definitions—
have been offered to define the notion of patent trolling. As a result, 
seemingly arcane disagreements over the terms of measurement can have a 
significant effect on the legislative and regulatory rules chosen to address 
inappropriate use of patents, as well as the business models that develop in 
anticipation of or in response to those legal regimes.  Words matter, and 
never more so than in the current political climate. Thus, the following 
section will describe the different terms and definitions that have been 
suggested by various scholars, commentators, and market actors and 
explore the theoretical bases for each. The section will also explain the 
parameters chosen for this study and the logic behind those choices. 
In discussing the topic of patent assertion, many have used the term 
non-practicing entity, or NPE, to describe entities that do not use the patents 
they own to create anything. In the code-like language of patents, using the 
ideas in the patent to create a product is called “practicing the patent,” and 
thus, those who do not create products are called “non-practicing.” Among 
many others, Congress used the term NPE in directing the non-partisan 
General Accounting Office to study patent assertion.22  
Problems with the term NPE include the question of whether to 
incorporate universities in the definition. Universities are in the business of 
scientific research and education, and they generally do not engage in the 
production of products from their inventions. Thus, they do not actually 
practice the ideas in their patent portfolios. Universities, however, 
traditionally do not engage in extensive patent litigation, filing only one-
half of one percent of all patent lawsuits in a recent four-year period, for 
example.23 Thus, they do not appear to engage in the same types of behavior 
as other entities that do not practice their patents. 
                                                
22  See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29 § 34 (2011) (directing the 
nonpartisan General Accounting Office to study the effects of non-practicing entities on 
U.S. patent litigation); see also 157 CONG. REC. S5441 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 2011) (statement 
of Sen. Patrick Leahy). 
23 See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 3, at 41. 
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In addition to issues related to universities, the term non-practicing 
“entity” could be interpreted to include only those who are organized in a 
particular manner—a limitation that could be problematic. Some of the 
most famous modern examples of those whose core activity is patent 
assertion are individuals, rather than entities.24 Other prolific monetizers are 
organized as trusts.25  
The distinction between “entities” and “non-entities” has led to 
confusion, particularly with the GAO report on patent assertion. In 
measuring lawsuits filed by what it termed “patent assertion entities,” the 
report noted a significant, but smaller, increase in lawsuits from such 
entities than was noted by other studies. Much of the difference between the 
studies can be attributed to the GAO methodology, which included in its 
numbers only those organized as corporations or partnerships but not those 
organized as trusts or operating as individuals.26 This led to some odd 
results. For example, the greatest number of lawsuits filed in the GAO’s 
own 500 case sample was filed by someone organized as a trust.27 A well-
known name in patent assertion circles, the business activity of this trust is 
licensing and litigating patents. Nevertheless, the GAO excluded this trust 
from the count of patent assertion entities, as well as excluding other trusts 
and individuals engaged in the same activity. 
The reverse definitional problem occurred early on when some 
researchers defined patent trolls only as individuals.  In particular, one of 
the earliest data-based analyses of modern patent trolling looked only at 
individual inventors.28 Focusing only on the individuals, however, ,misses 
much of the activity. 
From a definitional standpoint, it should not matter whether one 
chooses to organize oneself as a corporation, a partnership, a trust, or 
simply to act as an individual. It is the activity that matters.29 Thus, in 
                                                
24 See, e.g., David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y. TIMES 
(July 13, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patent-will-sue-an-alert-
to-corporate-america.html (profiling Erich Spangenberg). 
25 See Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman & Joshua Walker, The America Invents Act 500: Effects 
of Patent Monetization Entities on US Litigation, 11 DUKE L & TECH. REV. 357, 382 
(2012) (analyzing the data that the authors provided to the GAO). 
26 See United States Government Accountability Office Report, Intellectual Property: 
Assessing Factors That Affect Patent Infringement Litigation Could Help Improve Patent 
Quality, at 17 n.35 (August 2013) (noting the exclusion of individuals and trusts and the 
resulting variation from the Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 3). 
27 See id. 
28 See James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, PATENT FAILURE 16 (2008).  
29 One could argue that certain organizational formations facilitate so-called trolling 
behavior more smoothly, for example, by limiting the targets ability to respond.  We see 
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studying the venture-backed community, I used a definition that included all 
whose core business activity involves licensing or litigating patents as 
opposed to making products.  The definition, therefore, includes not just 
those organized as a corporation or partnership but also those organized as 
trusts or operating as individuals.   
The GAO’s term, “patent assertion entity,” raises other difficulties 
as well. The term patent assertion entity, or PAE, focuses on entities whose 
primary activity is to purchase patents to make licensing demands against 
others who make products—in other words, to “assert” their patents. The 
Federal Trade Commission in particular has used the term PAE.30  The 
term, however, is subject to additional confusion.  For example, does the 
notion of an “assertion entity” include only those who file lawsuits or does 
it also encompass those who assert by making licensing demands short of 
filing a lawsuit? Some entities have tried to suggest that those who assert 
only through licensing demands should be excluded from the term “patent 
assertion entity.”  For example, the patent aggregator RPX buys patents, 
grants licenses to those who purchase the rights to their portfolios, but 
reserves the right to transfer those patents to others—subject to the licenses.  
In other words, those who might buy the patents could sue anyone other 
than companies who have already purchased a license from RPX. Although 
the buyer’s patents may file infringement lawsuits, RPX does not file any 
lawsuits itself.  
In press interviews, RPX officials have noted that they have sold 
patent rights only infrequently, and have explained the rational for those 
sales. For example, they describe using the practice to drive reluctant parties 
to join the RPX network and avoid free rider costs.31 In addition, RPX 
                                                                                                                       
this as more central to issues related to the effectiveness of the behavior, rather than as a 
reason to alter the definition. 
30 FTC, The Evolving IP Marketplace: Aligning Patent Notice And Remedies With 
Competition 8 at n.5 (2011), 
www.ftc.gov/os/2011/03/110307patentreport.pdf [hereinafter Evolving IP 
Marketplace] (defining PAE as having a business model focused on “purchasing and 
asserting patents against manufacturers already using the technology, rather than 
developing and transferring the technology”); see also Ramirez, supra note 20. 
31 A Fortune Magazine feature story on RPX reported on RPX’s sales to other NPEs. The 
story quotes John Amster, CEO of RPX: 
The practice is used in part, Amster admits, to drive prospects into the 
network that otherwise feel no need, because RPX, at the behest of their 
competitors, has already purchased the portfolios that most threaten their 
industry sector. Such prospects sometimes claim to see no value in the 
portfolios RPX has already purchased. “We all them back a few months 
later,” Amster says, “and say, ‘Look. We put it up for sale. There’s an 
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purchases patents from NPEs that have already filed lawsuits, buying a 
license for existing RPX clients and an option for the remaining defendants. 
RPX then approaches the remaining defendants, offering to buy them out of 
the lawsuit in exchange for joining RPX.32 
Distinguishing between those who assert by licensing demands and 
lawsuits as opposed to those who assert only by licensing demands would 
be problematic. From a practical perspective, much of the patent assertion 
activity occurs outside of litigation, and studies estimate that 90% of 
demands for a patent license never proceed all the way to a lawsuit, 
presumably because either the target agrees to pay a fee or the demand is 
dropped.33 All of these demands, however, occur in the shadow of a 
potential lawsuit.34  A license, after all, is merely an agreement not to sue in 
return for a monetary payment, and the threat of a lawsuit is what drives 
companies to pay the licensing fee. Thus, in examining patent assertion 
behavior it makes little sense to look only at assertions that progress all the 
way to the particular moment of filing a lawsuit, rather than the other 
assertions that take place in the shadow of that filing.  
From an economic perspective as well, there may be very little 
difference between those who file lawsuits and those who do not—at least if 
those who do not file lawsuits are willing to transfer patents to others who 
will file suit or to purchase patents out of existing lawsuits. Imagine an 
entity that chastely refuses to file any lawsuits, but sells its patents to or 
buys its patents from hypothetical nasty third parties, who do sue. The price 
of the patent when it is sold reflects the expected value of the lawsuit. Thus, 
                                                                                                                       
NPE who’s willing to pay us for it.” And sometimes they say, ‘You’re no 
different than they are’ [likening RPX to the trolls.] And we say, ‘Hey, 
wait a minute. Back up. We bought this on behalf of our clients. You told 
us there was no value to it. The market has spoken, and there is value. 
Somebody is going to sue you. We didn’t call them and tell them to sue 
you. We said, ’Here’s an asset. It’s for sale.’ If you don’t think it’s a risk, 
then fine.” 
Roger Parloff, Taking on the Trolls, FORTUNE (March 17, 2014). 
32 See id. 
33 See Feldman, Ewing & Jeruss, supra note 3, at 32.  The study notes that the 2013 White 
House Report on Patent Assertion cites conservative estimates of the number of patent 
threats in 2012 at 60,000 with the actual number more likely over 100,000.  Comparing 
even the more conservative number of patent demands with the roughly 5,000 lawsuits 
filed in 2012, one can conclude that more than 90% of patent demands do not reach the 
courthouse door. 
34 The concept of bargaining in the shadow of the law is introduced and explored in the 
seminal article, Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhausert, Bargaining in the Shadow of the 
Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950 (1979).  
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the chaste entity receives the economic benefit of that lawsuit, even without 
having to file the suit itself. Moreover, the chaste entity’s licensing activity 
benefits from the possibility of sale to those who will sue. In other words, 
target companies are encouraged to buy licenses from the chaste entity for 
fear that they will have to face a lawsuit from the nasty third party who 
might buy the patent. The threat, implicit or explicit, is that if one does not 
join the club, one will be left out in the cold as the only target available for 
the nasty third party to sue.35 The same is true when the chaste entity 
purchases patents out of already existing lawsuits. The chaste entity may be 
able to provide benefit from economies of scale or repeat experience, but 
once again, it benefits from a system in which patent lawsuits are filed and 
from the economic pressure of the costs and risks of the litigation, even 
though it does not file lawsuits directly itself.  In short, a distinction 
between those whose assertion profile includes lawsuits and those whose 
assertion profile does not makes little sense practically or economically.  
The FTC avoids this problem, defining patent assertion entities to 
include those who assert by licensing demands as well as those who assert 
by lawsuits, but the agency adds its own variation on the theme. The FTC 
defines patent assertion entity to include only those who purchase and 
assert patents, the implication being that one who originally obtained the 
patent would be excluded.36 In other words, those who obtain patents and 
assert them are not included in the definition of patent assertion entities. In 
particular, the definition would exclude entities in the semi-conductor 
industry—such as Qualcomm and Rambus—that spend large sums 
researching and designing products.37  Companies such as these may create 
prototypes to license others to produce but do not actually manufacture the 
product themselves.  These entities have argued fervently that they should 
not be considered part of any definition of patent troll. 
Some Congressional proposals contain a variant of this approach. 
They would exempt those who have expended significant resources in 
attempting to work the patent from provisions related to curbing patent 
assertion abuse. 
                                                
35 For an allegation that entities like RPX make this threat explicit, see Tom Ewing & 
Robin Feldman, The Giants Among Us, 2012 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 1, 29-30 (citing letter to 
the FBI from Kaspersky Labs).  In press interviews, RPX notes that it has sold rights only 
infrequently. 
36 See id. 
37 See Daniel Culley et al., Learning from Rambus—How to tame those troublesome trolls, 
57 ANTITRUST BULL. 117 (2012) (using both Rambus and Qualcomm as examples of 
corporations that invent and produce patented products and subsequently take steps to 
monetize the patents they’ve obtained). 
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 This definitional issue is perhaps the most challenging, and it 
deserves considerable exploration. To the extent that society is concerned 
about those who assert patents as a business practice without contributing to 
the creation of products for society, the semi-conductor companies have a 
point. Engaging in significant research and development that leads to the 
creation of a viable product should be considered a productive activity, even 
if the company chooses to hire others to do the actual manufacturing. 
Economists generally would frown on a rule that preferences vertical 
integration—in other words, they would reject a rule providing incentives 
for one company to engage in all the levels of production necessary for a 
final product. 
 Nevertheless, defining patent assertion entities as only those who 
buy and assert patents risks omitting a significant amount of activity that 
could look much like the remainder of what falls within the definition. In 
addition, the more limited definition implies that original patent holders 
should be omitted from the legislative and regulatory reform proposals that 
may be developed to address modern concerns about the inappropriate use 
of patents. This, in turn, suggests that original patent holders are unlikely to 
create the types of problems that are fueling current patent trolling 
concerns.  
The logic behind such a conclusion is questionable, however, when 
one considers the following. The patent system has operated for some time 
with a high percentage of rights that are never actualized.38 These shadow 
rights have remained largely on the periphery of the patent system, creating 
no direct returns for the patent holder. In fact, studies suggest that more than 
90% of patents never create a direct return for the patent holder.39 
 Many of these patents may be of questionable value. The Patent & 
Trademark Office lacks the resources to examine the massive number of 
patent applications that come through its doors—not with the level of 
scrutiny required to eliminate weak patents, or weak claims within a patent. 
For example, one scholar has estimated that patent examiners spend no 
more than 18 hours on any patent application, and this time is likely to be 
                                                
38 I have described the issue of shadow rights, and problems with monetization of those 
rights, in greater detail. See Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J.L. 
BUS. & FIN. 247, 261-63 (2013). That discussion is summarized here.  
39 Gideon Parchomovsky & R. Polk Wagner, Patent Portfolios, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 66 
(2005) (noting that estimates suggest that less than 5 percent of patents hold any value).  
See also Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & 
ECON. 265, 267 (1977).	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spread over two to three years.40 With patent applications containing dozens 
or even hundreds of claims, the available time is simply insufficient.  
It is not just the patent as a whole that may be weak. Even if some 
claims within the patent have merit, others may be of questionable validity. 
Patent drafters frequently write a range of claims, including very 
aggressive, broadly reaching claims down to much more narrow and 
specific ones.41 Patent examiners may cull out some of the overbroad and 
weaker ones, but with the limited time available to review each patent, 
examiners are not likely to catch all weak claims. Nevertheless, each 
individual claim can be launched on its own against a target company. 
The system may have worked reasonably well when fewer patents 
were operationalized. Rather than concentrating resources up front, the legal 
system could focus its energy on the few patents that became valuable 
enough to make it to litigation.42  In a system of intense monetization, 
however, every patent, and every claim within each patent, has the potential 
to be launched against product manufacturers to garner a return. Thus, the 
fact that the patent being asserted was written by the patent holder is no 
guarantee that it is better than any other patent.  
Moreover, exempting those who have originated the patent could 
have the effect of merely altering how the patent assertion business is 
organized. For example, rather than purchasing a patent from the original 
patent holder, the monetizer could simply join forces with the original 
inventor, either using the patent holder as a front for the monetization 
activities or simply funding monetization efforts by the patent holder in 
exchange for a healthy share of the returns. In that manner, the monetizer 
has now escaped the definition of “one who purchases and asserts patents” 
simply by not purchasing.  The market has already developed complicated 
schemes in which product companies or aggregators fund the monetization 
activities of others, along these lines.  
                                                
40 Mark A. Lemley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1495, 1500 
(2001). 
41 See ROBIN FELDMAN, RETHINKING PATENT LAW 40-74 (2012) (describing how modern 
patents operate). 
42 See id.; see also Christian Bessy & Eric Brousseau, Technology Licensing Contracts: 
Features and Diversity, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 451, 459 (1998); Eric Brousseau & 
Christian Bessy, Public and Private Institutions in the Governance of Intellectual Property 
Rights, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: INNOVATION, GOVERNANCE, AND THE 
INSTITUTIONAL ENVIRONMENT 251 (Birgitte Andersen, ed., 2006); Dan L. Burk & Mark A. 
Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89  VA. L. REV. 1575 (2003); F. Scott Kieff, The 
Case for Registering Patents and the Law and Economics of Present Patent-Obtaining 
Rules, 45 B.C. L. REV. 55 (2003); Kelly Casey Mullally, Legal (Un)Certainty, Legal 
Process, and Patent Law, 42 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1109 (2010). 
15
Feldman: Patent Demands & Startup Companies: The View from the Venture Cap
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
16 YALE J.L. & TECH. 236 (2014)  2013-2014  
251 
In addition, monetizers and aggregators could simply choose to get 
into the business of filing for patents. Thus, if we choose to define patent 
assertion entities to exclude those who file for patents, we could be 
inadvertently incentivizing the creation of an industry of applying for 
patents for the purpose of monetizing them, rather than for the purpose of 
creating products for society.  
There is an even more subtle issue, however, involved in exempting 
the original patent holder from the definition of monetization. As a society, 
we have a romantic attachment to the notion of the inventor, which spills 
over into a romanticized image of those who hold patents. I have described 
this romanticized image in the following manner: 
In the classic story of invention, a great thinker toils to create 
a wonderful innovation, files for a patent to protect what he 
or she has contributed to the store of human knowledge, and 
then produces a new product that enters the market, 
improving the lives of all citizens. In a variation on this 
theme, the valiant inventor, deeply immersed in the pursuit 
of innovation, lacks the capital, experience or interest to 
commercialize the invention. The inventor then simply 
licenses the patent to a third party, who brings forth the 
product for the betterment of society. Copyright tells a 
similar tale that features brilliant writers hunched over 
coffeehouse tables, or dedicated computer programmers 
toiling late into the night, accompanied only by caffeine and 
their dreams. 43 
It is a lovely story, and one that undoubtedly exists to some extent, 
but much of the modern patent world looks nothing like this.  
In particular, most people assume that a patented invention can 
create a product. This assumption could not be farther from the truth. Most 
products require a multitude of intellectual property in order to create a 
viable product. Such intellectual property may include numerous patents, as 
well as trade secrets and those wonderfully named components, “know 
how” and “show how.” Even if the knowledge captured in the patent can be 
translated successfully into a product, that product must be developed 
further into a form that is stable and can be mass produced and distributed, 
which requires additional intellectual property, knowledge, and skill. The 
gap between a patented idea and a viable product is known colloquially as 
                                                
43 Robin Feldman, Intellectual Property Wrongs, 18 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 250 (2013); 
Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709 (2012). 
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the “valley of death,” a valley that only a few hardy souls are able to cross. 
Thus, most patent holders who try to develop a product are destined to 
become failed entrepreneurs. 
Psychology research suggests that we often assess items as having 
greater value when they belong to us than when they belong to someone 
else.44 In addition, anyone who has ever represented a client can attest that 
clients generally believe their claim is right, a perspective that cannot 
possibly be accurate for all sides at all times. Such selective reasoning can 
be explained by the coherence effect, a psychological phenomenon under 
which people who examine a heterogeneous set of facts are likely to make 
inferences that are shaped by their own biases and preferred conclusions.45  
Even if people begin their reasoning processes by looking for facts that 
support both sides of an argument, the underlying tendency toward biased 
reasoning can lead to a variety of subconsciously selective behaviors.46  
This includes framing one’s research inquiries in a way that only pulls in 
favorable evidence (a selective framing strategy) and choosing only the 
evidence that is likely to support a particular hypothesis (selective 
exposure).47 
One might anticipate that these types of distortions would be 
enhanced by those who are not repeat players and who have less experience 
in the arcane world of patent law, a description likely to apply to many 
individual inventors. Our fascination with the romanticized individual 
inventor could inadvertently fuel a cottage industry. Failed entrepreneurs, 
which most entrepreneurs are likely to be, would be encouraged to turn to 
patent assertion as a second career—a career that would provide a handy 
outlet for frustration over the inability to get a product off the ground. With 
monetizers willing to join forces and fund these efforts behind the scenes, if 
we exempt original patent holders from the definition of monetizers, we 
may simply shift the current modes of monetization—with all of their 
                                                
44 See, e.g., Ziv Carmon & Dan Ariely, Focusing on the Foregone: How Value Can Appear 
So Different To Buyers And Sellers, 27 J. CONSUMER RES. 360 (2000). 
45 DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS, 34-35 
(2012). 
46 Id. at 36-37. 
47 Id. at 37. See also id. at 38.  (Selective scrutiny[:] . . . [R]esearch demonstrates that 
people tend to scrutinize information that is incompatible with their conclusion, but apply 
lax standards when assessing the validity of compatible information . . . . Biased 
evaluation[:] . . . [T]he most ubiquitous form of biased reasoning occurs through a distorted 
evaluation of evidence . . . . Selective stopping[:] . . . [A] limited body of research suggests 
that people tend to shut down inquiries after having found a sufficient amount of evidence 
to support their leading hypothesis.) (Citations omitted). 
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problems—into a different form. Rather than curbing abuses, the result 
could be the same monetization with a different face.  
Exempting original patent holders may reflect concerns about 
problems that small players face in the patent system, and small players are 
certainly at a disadvantage in the expensive and complex world of patents. 
Some small companies and individual inventors have complained that large 
companies are less than diligent, to put it mildly, in responding to 
complaints that rights are being trampled. Rights, of course, are useless if 
one cannot enforce them, a concept that is as critical for intellectual 
property as for any other set of rights. The system must be designed to 
avoid indifference to intellectual property rights, as well as to deter outright 
theft. 
Nevertheless, exempting the original patent holder from the 
definition of patent assertion entities could have significant limitations. The 
fact that the one asserting the patent also filed for the patent, or spent 
resources trying to commercialize it, is no guarantee that the patent is 
valuable or that it is being launched at an appropriate target. The infamous 
and controversial inventor Jerome Lemelson illustrates the problem. 
According to press reports, the Lemelson Foundation and its barcode related 
patents received close to $1.5 billion in settlements over a 14-year period in 
the 1990s and early 2000s.48 These patents were invalidated by the courts in 
2005.  
In light of the issues described above, we should be wary of creating 
definitional boundaries that will have the effect of suggesting that original 
patent holders should be exempted from measures to curb monetization 
abuses, and we certainly should be wary of measurements that exclude 
original patent holders from the categories to be examined. Thus, I have 
chosen to include both those who file for patents and assert them as well as 
those who purchase patents and assert them in the definition for this study. 
In short, in choosing the terms and definitions for this article, I have 
opted for simple and broad terms, avoiding the fine distinctions that are 
increasingly appearing in the discourse. For example, rather than non-
practicing entities or patent assertion entities, I use the term monetizers. It 
has the advantage of not distinguishing among actors based on the form 
they choose, and of referencing individuals as well as “entities.” I define 
monetizers as those whose core business involves licensing and litigating 
patents, rather than making products.  This definition has the virtue of 
simplicity, and allows one to speak broadly about the phenomenon. I must 
                                                
48 See Roger Parloff, Taking on the Trolls, FORTUNE (Mar. 17, 2014).  
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reiterate, however, that the topic is complicated, and that in a politically 
charged atmosphere, every word is at issue. 
One also must decide what activity to measure, in addition to 
choosing the definition of those involved in the activity. As described 
above, prior work has explored monetization in the context of activity after 
the patent holder files a lawsuit. There are excellent practical reasons for 
focusing on lawsuits. Activity before that time generally is shrouded in 
nondisclosure agreements and difficult to access through public documents. 
This study, however, was intended to look at the effects of a range of patent 
activity. Thus, in framing the questions in the survey, I chose the term 
“patent demands” and defined the term broadly to include demand letters, 
threats of litigation, or lawsuits. Specifically, respondents were asked 
whether they had “received patent demands, for example, demand letters, 
threats of litigation, or infringement lawsuits.” 
D. Brief History and Overview of Startup Financing 
Although today’s technology startups have created the enduring 
image of the scrappy, underfinanced underdog that goes on to create the 
next Facebook from someone’s garage, technology startups used to require 
massive investments to get off the ground.49  Early venture capital-backed 
technology companies required sizable investments in manufacturing, 
engineering, personnel, and professional services in order to enter the 
market.50  As a result, early tech companies like Digital Equipment 
Corporation (DEC) and Tandem had to get their funding from large venture 
capital firms such as Arthur Rock and Kleiner Perkins.51   
Thanks to the success of these prototypical venture-backed 
initiatives, the operating model established by these early venture capitalists 
has endured to this day.52  Under this model, venture capital firms 
“provid[e] capital to high-potential businesses in exchange for partial 
ownership of the firm.”53  Traditionally, venture capital funding has filled 
the crucial gap between early seed funding, such as money from friends and 
family, and later rounds of investment.54  As protection for risking large 
                                                
49 Ben Horowitz, How Angel Investing Is Different Than Venture Capital, BUSINESS 




52 Id.  
53 Brian L. Dos Santos, Pankaj C. Patel, & Rodney R. D’Souza, Venture Capital Funding 
for Information Technology Businesses, 12 J. ASS’N INFO. SYSTEMS 57, 59 (2011). 
54 Bob Zider, How Venture Capital Works, HARV. BUS. REV., Nov.-Dec. 1998, at 131, 132. 
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amounts of capital on nascent businesses, venture capitalists take an active 
role in managing them, with the expectation that enough of these companies 
will become successful to provide sufficient returns on their investments.55  
By insisting on direct involvement in the operation of a company, 
commonly in the form of seats on the company’s board, venture capitalists 
seek to leverage their significant experience in the relevant industry to 
provide new entrepreneurs with seasoned advice.56  Venture capitalists also 
insist on certain downside protections that allow them to protect their 
investments in the company if circumstances change.57  For example, 
venture capitalists will usually require that their interest in a company be 
issued as preferred equity that comes with a liquidation preference, which 
allows the venture capitalists to get their money out first if the company is 
liquidated.58  Another common requirement for a venture-backed deal is 
anti-dilution protection, which allows the venture capital firm to maintain 
its percentage of equity ownership in the event of a subsequent round of 
financing by requiring that the venture capital firm gets issued additional 
shares to preserve its current equity position at the expense of common 
stockholders.59  Though these requirements can entail significant sacrifices 
on the part of founders, the risky nature of investments in their companies 
often leaves little choice.  
The importance of venture capitalists’ willingness to invest in high-
risk companies must not be understated.  In particular, this willingness 
provides an essential lifeline to entrepreneurs, whose businesses usually 
cannot access lower-cost capital early on due to their minimal assets.60  
“Uncertainty is inherent in startup companies because their innovative 
products and business plans are untested at the time of investment.”61  
Given how difficult it is for a new startup to achieve early success in its 
chosen market, if venture capitalists were not tolerant of failure, many 
promising startups would otherwise be liquidated after early progress 
proved unsatisfactory.62  This risk tolerance does far more than prevent a 
venture capitalist’s early exit.  Research shows that those venture capitalists 
that are more tolerant of failure tend to pick more innovative startups to 
                                                
55 Id. at 133. 
56 Id. at 138-39. 
57 Id. at 134. 
58 Id.  
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 132-33. 
61 Abraham J.B. Cable, Fending for Themselves: Why Securities Regulations Should 
Encourage Angel Groups, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 107, 121 (2011). 
62 Xuan Tian & Tracy Yue Wang, Tolerance for Failure and Corporate Innovation, REV. 
OF FIN. STUD. 211 (2014).  
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invest in.63 In turn, startups supported by such venture capitalists have more 
successful initial public offerings and produce greater numbers of patents—
patents that tend to have a greater impact on their respective markets.64  In 
general, venture-backed businesses have a significantly higher rate of 
survival than those without venture backing. ”65 It is unsurprising, then, that 
in the years since their rise to prominence, venture capital firms have 
become “important intermediaries in financial markets, providing capital to 
new ventures that might otherwise have difficulty attracting financing.”66  
Although venture capital firms remain an important part of startup 
financing, a lot has changed since the early days of the tech industry, and 
the needs of newly-formed startups are now quite different.  Modern 
startups are far less capital-intensive than they used to be, and now 
frequently require less money than the typical minimum venture capital 
investment.67  As a result, there is often what some have called a “funding 
gap” between the amount covered by seed funding, which is usually below 
$500,000, “and the minimum amounts venture capital funds invest . . . 
[which is] typically $5,000,000.”68  In addition, venture capitalists may ask 
for more control than a modern startup can afford in its earliest stages. In 
addition, venture capitalists have a lengthy diligence process and can take 
up to six months to decide whether they will invest, which may be far too 
slow for a startup in dire need of funds.69  Finally, and quite significantly, 
venture capitalists may leverage their equity ownership and board seats to 
force a founder out of the company if the venture capitalist determines that 
the founder is responsible for poor performance, an aspect that founders 
would, understandably, wish to avoid.70  
As a result, funding sources outside the traditional venture-backed 
system have risen in prominence to meet the changing needs of founders.  
One such source is the angel investor, a wealthy individual that funds 
promising startups before they are ready for venture capital.71  Unlike 
                                                
63 Id. at 211. 
64 Id. 
65 A. L. Zacharakis & G. D. Meyer, Lack of Insight: Do Venture Capitalists Really 
Understand Their Own Decision Process?, 13 J. BUS. VENTURING 57, 57-76 (1998). 
66 Dos Santos et al., supra note 53. at 58. 
67 Cable, supra note 61, at 108; see also Horowitz, supra note 49. 
68 Cable, supra note 61, at 108. 
69 Martin Zwilling, Top 10 Sources Of Funding For Start-ups, FORBES (Feb. 12, 2010), 
http://www.forbes.com/2010/02/12/funding-for-startups-entrepreneurs-finance-
zwilling.html; see also Horowitz, supra note 49. 
70 See generally Zider, supra note 54, at 136 (noting that VC equity ownership and deal 
structure give VCs the ability to make management changes for companies with mediocre 
performances). 
71 Cable, supra note 61, at 108-09. 
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venture capitalists, angel investors usually do not insist on control rights 
like board seats, leaving founders with the ability to control their company’s 
direction and strategy for longer.72  Angels are also willing to invest smaller 
amounts of money, which helps fill the “funding gap” and allows founders 
to raise money from a greater number of sources.73  Combined with the fact 
that angels often use their connections to bring other angels on board, 
companies can sometimes get by on an initial financing consisting solely of 
angel investments.74  Nevertheless, companies backed solely by venture 
capitalists do better overall than those with backing from a combination of 
venture capitalists and angels or angels alone, in terms of achieving an 
initial pubic offering or a merger. Research has shown, however, that 
companies with angel-only financings were significantly less likely to fail 
than companies receiving venture financing.75 
An even more recent development is the rise of startup incubators, 
which provide not only financial resources but also strategic planning 
assistance and infrastructure like office space and computer equipment, in 
exchange for equity.76  Participants benefit both from this expert guidance, 
and also from the ability to network internally with other companies being 
supported by the same incubator.77  Furthermore, a fledgling startup can 
stick with an incubator from inception straight through its initial public 
offering, should it come to pass. In fact, since many incubators focus on 
early stage companies, they often sell their interests once the company goes 
public, thus focusing more on short-term profit than long-term influence 
over the company.78 
Although the process by which potential investors engage with 
startups can vary greatly depending on the parties involved, one 
increasingly common factor considered by many investors—particularly in 
the technology industry—is the strength of a company’s intellectual 
property position.79  In today’s highly competitive landscape—in which 
investors are presented with numerous possible ventures with each seeking 
support for a new, unproven technology—a company’s intellectual property 
                                                
72 Id. at 129. 
73 See Horowitz, supra note 49. 
74 Cable, supra note 61, at 131. 
75 Cable, supra note 61, at 129. 
76 Meredith M. Brown, Michael P. Harrell, & William D. Regner, Internet Incubators: 
How to Invest in the New Economy Without Becoming an Investment Company, 56 BUS. 
LAW. 273, 273 (2000). 
77 Id. at 273-74. 
78 Id. at 274. 
79 Joseph Hadzima, Bruce Bockmann, & Alexander Butler, IP in early stage commercial 
and investment success, INTELLECTUAL ASSET MGMT., Mar.-Apr. 2010, 49. 
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situation can make a large difference in determining which companies 
ultimately get funded.  Research has shown that there is a “marked 
correlation between success” as measured by a company achieving its initial 
public offering or getting acquired “and a company having developed (or 
possessed) intellectual property,” a correlation that is “even greater . . . 
[when] companies . . . have good or strong intellectual property 
positions.”80  As one venture capitalist has commented, “[it is] impossible to 
get financing without a good patent strategy, freedom to operate and good 
prospects of patentability.”81 
Given the importance of venture backing to the startup community, 
as well as the advantage of a concentrated body of respondents, this study 
examines the viewpoints and experiences of venture capitalists and their 
portfolio companies in relation to patent demands. Details of the study are 
provided in the design and methodology section below. 
E. Design of Study and Participants 
The study was conducted in September and October of 2013. Two 
surveys were prepared, one for venture capitalists and one for companies 
within the portfolios of those venture capitalists. Both surveys were 
submitted to the Western Institutional Review Board, which determined that 
the research met the exemption criteria for human subjects research under 
45 C.F.R. § 46.101(b)(2).82 The surveys were prepared for distribution 
through the National Venture Capital Association. The survey language was 
tested by staff members of the National Venture Capital Association, as 
well as by selected board members of the Association who volunteered to 
serve as testers. 
The National Venture Capital Association distributed both versions 
of the survey by email to their member venture capitalists, asking that the 
members fill out the venture capital survey themselves and distribute the 
company survey to their portfolio companies.  Participants were told that 
the responses would be anonymous and reported only in the aggregate. The 
results were anonymized prior to delivery to the author.  
Prior to the survey, the National Venture Capital Association had 
not taken a position on patent assertion. In introducing the survey, member 
companies were told the following: 
                                                
80 Id. at 49. 
81 See Chien, Patent Assertion and Startup Innovation, supra note 12. 
82 See Letter from Western Institutional Review Board dated September 4, 2013 (on file 
with author).  
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In light of recent patent reform discussions on Capitol Hill, 
the NVCA is working with Robin Feldman, Professor and 
Director of the Institute for Innovation Law at University of 
California Hastings to gather information about the current 
environment for patent assertions within the venture-backed 
company community.  While we have anecdotal information 
that patent trolling has become increasingly problematic for 
many of our members and their portfolio companies, 
particularly in the IT space, we do not have data to quantify 
the size and breadth of the issue. 
The survey included questions about the respondent’s individual 
experiences followed by questions about the respondent’s overall 
impressions. In order to ensure that answers about the respondent’s 
individual experiences were derived from direct experience to the extent 
possible, venture capital respondents were asked to answer the direct 
experience questions only for companies “upon whose boards you 
personally sit as an investor.”  
Early in the survey, participants were asked whether they or one of 
their companies had ever received patent demands. Those who answered, 
“no” were routed directly to the final set of questions related to the 
respondent’s perceptions of patent demands.   
F. Study Limitations 
Research through voluntary responses always contains significant 
limitations. The results can be skewed by those who choose to respond, 
presenting less than a full picture of the experiences of all members of the 
group. Similarly, the framing of the question can create a demand problem, 
priming those who have experienced the problem to respond. Most 
important, the answers represent the respondent’s perceptions and cannot be 
individually verified. For example, if a respondent notes that the company 
has spent $50,000 responding to patent assertions, there are no public 
documents or other independent data to verify the figure. 
Individual perceptions, however, may be useful for some of the 
inquiries in this type of survey. For example, to the extent we are examining 
whether the issue of patent demands occupies an entrepreneur’s mindshare, 
thereby potentially causing distraction, the entrepreneur’s own impression 
of whether a problem exists can be helpful.  
Along the same lines, if legislators and regulators believe they are 
responding to the needs of a particular sector of the market, it is useful to 
know whether that sector of the market agrees. For example, to the extent 
governmental officials believe patent assertion is necessary to attract 
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venture capital for startups, it is important to know whether the venture 
capitalists have the same perception. Nevertheless, perceptions are no 
guarantee of reality for issues such as how widespread a problem may be or 
the ways in which it is manifesting itself.  
I note in particular that the results may be skewed by the large 
percentage of respondents who operate in the information technology 
sector. This could reflect a particular interest of those in the information 
technology sector in the issue of patent demands, which could, in turn, 
suggest that patent demands are a particular problem in that sector, an issue 
that will be addressed further below. It could also simply suggest that a 
larger portion of venture-backed companies are in the information 
technology industry. Nevertheless, it is important to note the prevalence of 
responses from that sector. 
Looking at both venture capitalists and their portfolio companies not 
only provided a broader sample, it also allowed a comparison of whether 
the companies themselves agreed with their venture backers about the 
extent of the problems, the costs involved, etc. In other words, it provided 
some small measure of confirmation. 
Research of any kind into patent demand activity is quite difficult. 
Although one can study patent demands that proceed to a full-blown 
lawsuit, evidence suggests that these are only the tip of the iceberg. For 
patent demand activity outside of the courthouse, information is scarce. 
Patent interactions are shrouded in nondisclosure agreements. Moreover, for 
a number of years, companies have been reluctant to speak to reporters or 
researchers, partly out of fear of retaliation by large players with large 
patent portfolios.83 Thus, an anonymized survey, despite its many 
limitations, offers a useful vehicle for beginning to understand the issues at 
hand. 
Finally, in noting limitations, it is important to note that a sample 
size of slightly over 200 respondents is small. The experiences and 
observations are useful for understanding the venture-backed company 
community, and the information is important, in light of the research 
obstacles described above. Nevertheless, any observations should be 
tempered with the caution appropriate for a grouping of this limited size.  
                                                
83 See, e.g. Ewing & Feldman, supra note 35, at 4. “[W]e called people who had licensing 
arrangements with [a patent aggregator], we called people who were defendants in lawsuits 
involving [the aggregator’s] patents, we called every single company being sued by [a 
monetizing shell company]. No one would talk to us.”); see also Alex Blumberg & Laura 
Sydell, This American Life: When Patents Attack, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO (July 22, 
2011), transcript available at 
http://www.npr.org/blogs/money/2011/07/25/138576167/when-patents-attack. 
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G. General Characteristics of Respondents 
Respondents were given a choice of choosing information 
technology, life sciences, clean energy or other as the sector in which they 
operate. Venture capitalists were permitted to mark all categories that apply, 
which resulted in a total percentage that exceeds 100%.  
Of the venture capitalists that responded, 68% have portfolio 
companies operating in the information technology sector.84 41% of the 
venture capitalists have companies operating in the life sciences sector and 
19% in the clean energy sector. 10% of the venture capitalists have 
companies operating in sectors other than those categories, and respondents 
described those sectors as consumer apparel, oil and gas, retail, new media, 
industrial technology, and growth equity.85 
 
In which sectors do your portfolio companies operate?* 
Percentage of VC responses 
*Note:  The percentage of responses exceeds 100% 
because respondents could select multiple industries. 
 
 
The portfolio companies that chose to respond were even more 
strongly concentrated in the information technology sector, with 81% of 
respondents indicating that they operate in information technology. 6% of 
the companies operate in the life sciences and only 1% in clean energy. 
12% of the portfolio companies indicated that they operate in other sectors, 
which they further described as internet technology, consumer electronics, 
                                                
84 According to NVCA staff, the dominance of the information technology sector among 
respondents is also reflected in the overall membership. 
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consumer technology, eCommerce, eCommerce retail, retail, 3D printing, 




Portfolio companies were also asked where their company is 
located, and the results mirror common perceptions of startup hubs.  The 
largest group (32%) was located in California, with most of that in Northern 
California. Other groupings were located in Illinois (13%), Massachusetts 
(11%), New York (7%), Colorado (7%), Texas (7%), Wisconsin (4%), 
Virginia (2%), and Washington (2%). The Appendix contains a list of 
respondent locations by state. 
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Location of startup company headquarters 
 
II. RESULTS 
The article will separate the results into the following sections. The 
first section looks at the extent of patent demands against venture-backed 
companies, based on the direct experiences of the venture capitalists and 
their portfolio companies. This section also considers whether patent 
demands are a technology sector problem only. The second section 
examines the source of patent demands against venture-backed companies 
and the timing of those demands. The third section examines the impact of 
patent demands, looking at both the economic impact and the personal toll 
on the individuals involved. The fourth section examines the respondents’ 
perceptions of whether patent assertion is helpful or harmful for the 
venture-backed community and how patent demands affect a venture 
capitalist’s decision whether to fund a company. 
A. The Extent of Patent Demands Against Venture-Backed 
Companies 
Survey responses suggest an extensive amount of patent demand 
activity against venture-backed companies. Specifically, the survey asked 
venture capitalists whether any of their portfolio companies have received 
patent demands. Patent demands were defined broadly, with the question 
listing licensing demand letters, threats of litigation, and infringement 
lawsuits as examples of patent demands.  
70% of the venture capitalists reported that they have portfolio 
companies that have received patent demands.  
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In addition, the venture capitalists were in general agreement that 
patent demands are increasing against venture-backed companies. 79% 
responded that the number of patent demands have increased over the last 
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The data suggest, however, that the phenomenon is best understood 
on an industry wide basis, in other words, looking at the venture-backed 
industry as a whole.  Not all portfolio companies have received patent 
demands. For example, with venture capitalists whose companies have 
received patent demands, 60% have seen demands asserted against up to 
one-quarter of their portfolio companies, and 35% have seen demands 
asserted against between one-quarter and half of their portfolio companies. 
Similarly, with the portfolio companies themselves, 31% have received 
patent demands. Even the 31% number, however, is striking. It suggests that 
roughly one in three venture-backed companies must figure out how to 
respond to a patent demand.  
 On the whole, patent demands continue to dominate in the 
information technology sector. Venture Capitalists whose companies had 
received patent demands were asked whether they had experienced those 
demands in the information technology sector, life sciences, clean energy or 
other. Again, to account for broad venture portfolios, venture capitalists 
were permitted to mark all categories that applied, with the result that the 
total will exceed 100%. 
Of the venture capitalists whose companies have received patent 
demands, 70% have experienced those demands in the information 
technology sector. Patent demands, however, are not limited to the 
information technology sector. 30% of the relevant venture capitalists had 
received patent demands in the life sciences sector. In addition, 10% have 
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B. Source and Timing of Demands 
The study asked both the venture capitalists and the portfolio 
companies if they could identify the type of entities initiating the patent 
demands against them. As described in the methodology section above, 
respondents were asked whether the patent demands came from entities 
whose core activity is licensing and/or litigating patents as opposed to those 
whose core activity is not licensing and/or litigating patents. 
For 59% of the venture capitalists, the patent demands came either 
all or mostly from those whose core activity is licensing or litigating 
patents. For another 21% of the venture capitalists, the demands came from 
an equal mixture of those whose core activity is licensing and litigating 
patents and those whose core activity is not. The question allowed 
respondents to answer separately for “all” or “most”, although the chart 




 The portfolio companies responded with similar percentages on this 
question. For 66% of the portfolio companies, the patent demands came 
either all or mostly from those whose core activity is licensing or litigating 
patents. For another 11% of the portfolio companies, the demands came 
from an equal mixture of those whose core activity is licensing and 
litigating patents and those whose core activity is not. These results suggest 
that monetizers are initiating most of the patent demand activity against 
startups.  
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The study also looked for evidence of whether patent demands were 
timed to correspond with funding infusions. Anecdotes have circulated in 
the venture-backed community of companies receiving demands 
immediately after receiving their first round of funding. The results, 
however, did not reveal evidence of widespread patent demands related to 
receiving initial funding. Only 11% of portfolio companies reported 
receiving patent demands within one year of receiving their first round of 
venture funding, and 53% reported that they received their first patent 
demand more than a year after receiving the first round of venture funding. 
Moreover, 27% of the portfolio companies received their first patent 
demand before receiving any funding at all. Thus, we could find no 
systematic evidence of demands timed to coincide with initial rounds of 
venture funding. In contrast, in Chien’s interviews with venture capitalists, 
some noted that demands “seemed to be dictated by an event in the 
company’s development—publicity/success, an M&A or funding event, or 
the company’s IPO.”86 
Examining the initial round of venture funding cannot completely 
answer the question of whether there are patterns of demands timed to 
coincide with funding events. It is possible that monetization involves a 
variety of approaches, with some monetizers targeting funding events. It is 
also possible that monetizers target funding events on the whole, and no 
pattern would emerge from looking only at initial funding. Nevertheless, we 
                                                
86 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 11. An initial public offering 
(“IPO”) is the first sale of stock by a private company to the public. 
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did not find evidence of a sustained pattern of patent demands against 
venture-backed startups following their initial round of funding. 
C. Significance and Cost of Impact of Patent Demands on 
Venture-Backed Startups 
The study also examined the impact of patent demands on venture-
backed startups, both from a quantitative and a qualitative perspective. 
Venture capitalists were asked whether patent demands had a significant 
impact on any of their portfolio companies. Examples of significant impacts 
listed in the question included distracting management, expending 
resources, or altering business plans.  
Only 8% of the venture capitalists reported that the patent demands 
had no impact on any of their portfolio companies that received them. In 
contrast, 74% of the venture capitalists reported that patent demands had 
either a highly significant or a moderately significant impact on the 
companies that received them, including distracting management, 
expending resources, or altering business plans. Another 18% of the 
venture capitalists reported that patent demands had a mild impact.  
 
 
With the portfolio companies, 58% reported that patent demands 
had either a highly significant or moderately significant impact on their 
company, including distracting management, expending resources or 
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altering business plans. Another 31% reported that patent demands had a 
mild impact. Similar to the venture capitalists, only 9% of the portfolio 




It is interesting to note the difference between responses from the 
venture capitalists and responses from the companies regarding the extent 
of the impact on patent demands.  Although roughly 90% of both groups 
identified some impact, the venture capitalists rated that impact as highly or 
moderately significant far more frequently (74%) than did the companies 
themselves (58%). Although it is impossible to know without further 
examination, one could hypothesize various possible explanations for the 
difference. First, it is possible that the companies are in a better position to 
evaluate the true nature of the impact, given their more intimate 
involvement with day-to-day operations. Alternatively, the venture 
capitalists might be in a better position, given their breadth of their 
experience spread out across many companies. The difference could also 
reflect the small sample size. It may be that the venture capitalists who 
responded had sufficient experience to have encountered greater impact 
demand examples, while the companies that choose to respond did not 
happen to include ones that had experienced the greater impacts. Finally, it 
is also possible that the perception reflects the general “macho” culture of 
startup entrepreneurs. In other words, entrepreneurs may be prone to saying, 
“no problem, we can handle anything thrown at us,” while venture 
capitalists may be inclined to temper that interpretation. 
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Professor Colleen Chien’s study also looked at the impact of patent 
demands on startups. Using a more drastic definition of impact, Chien 
found that 40% of startups in her study that had received a patent demand 
from a patent assertion entity reported a “significant operational impact.”87 
Professor Chien defined significant operational impact as “a business 
strategy pivot, product change, business/business line exit, delay in hiring or 
meeting operational milestone, and/or a reduction in the value of the 
company.”88 Although the questions differ in both the type of impact 
studied and the issue of the source of the relevant patent demands measured, 
both studies demonstrate the impact that patents demands are having on 
startup companies. 
In terms of the cost of dealing with patent demands, the present 
survey asked both venture capitalists and portfolio companies to estimate 
the average cost to prepare for and defend against patent demands. For the 
venture capitalists, the survey asked for an average cost per company. The 
questions noted that such costs could include time for company officers and 
employees, costs of outside counsel and consultants, or other costs. 
57% of the venture capitalists estimated that the average cost per 
company to prepare for and defend against patent demands exceeds 
$100,000. Another 21% estimated that the cost of preparing for and 
defending against patent demands totaled between $50,000 and $100,000. 
 
                                                
87 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10.  
88 See id. 
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Portfolio companies estimated the costs of preparing for and 
defending against patent demands at a lower number. Only 40% of the 
portfolio companies estimated that costs of patent demands exceeded 
$100,000, in comparison to 57% of the venture capitalists. In addition, 29% 
of the portfolio companies estimated the costs at below $25,000, in contrast 
to 8% of the venture capitalists who estimated the cost at below $25,000.  
The two groups were roughly in agreement with each other for the 
percentage of companies that spent between $50,000 and $100,000, as well 
as for the percentage of companies that spent between $25,000 and $50,000. 
In short, a higher percentage of the venture capitalists reported average 
costs within the highest category than did the companies. One could 
hypothesize explanations along the same lines as those discussed in the 
prior question.  In particular, the venture capitalists who responded may 
have had sufficient experience to encounter higher cost patent demand 
examples, while the companies that choose to respond did not happen to 
include ones that had experienced the higher costs.  
 
 
 Professor Chien’s survey suggests a higher average cost figure for 
defending against patent demands. Again, her study was based on the costs 
of defending against patent demands specifically by patent assertion 
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entities—similar to what this study describes as monetizers.89 Depending on 
whether the startup chose to settle or fight, the average costs reported in 
Chien’s survey and interviews ranged from $168,000 to $857,000.90 These 
higher figures may reflect the ability of patent assertion entities to impose 
higher costs on their targets.91 
Finally, the question for the present survey may have been framed 
insufficiently to capture the significantly higher cost examples that were 
captured in Professor Chien’s survey. In particular, the highest cost 
category in the present survey was defined as over $100,000, while in the 
comments, some respondents noted that their costs had run into the 
millions. 
D. The Human Factor: Respondents Elaborate on the Impact of 
Patent Demands 
The most striking results in the study flowed from the venture 
capitalists and portfolio companies who took the time to provide details of 
the impact of patent demands on their companies. The survey provided 
space for respondents to elaborate on the impact of patent demands, and 
elaborate they did. 
1. Extraordinary Impacts 
Some companies and venture capitalists described extraordinary 
effects of patent demands on a particular company. One company had to 
raise a bridge round to cover costs related to dealing with patent demands. 
Another company spent millions of dollars defending against a lawsuit from 
“patent trolls,” and the company went under due to lack of funding. One 
venture capitalist described an “M&A [merger and acquisition] transaction 
escrow held up and millions spent in defense of [a] meritless patent suit 
from a patent troll.” Another described a couple of cases in which the 
companies experienced material financial impacts. 
                                                
89 For a description of different terms used in the discussion of patent demands, see supra 
notes 22-43 and accompanying text. 
90 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 11. 
91 Patent assertion entities may have large portfolios of patents, some of which include 
broad claims that are asserted in demand letters sent out by the thousands to small 
businesses.  The accuracy of the infringement claims made in these letters is often difficult 
to assess without large legal expenditures.  Many small businesses may decide to pay 
licensing fees to these entities to avoid greater costs.  See PATENT ASSERTION AND U.S. 
INNOVATION, supra note 17. 
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2. Distractions to Management and Engineers 
Numerous companies and venture capitalists spoke about the major 
distractions to management and other employees of the company, including 
time spent by engineers. One company noted pointedly that about 40% of 
the chief technical officer’s time was redirected to fighting two patent 
infringement lawsuits filed within three weeks of each other. Another 
company explained that patent demands had absorbed hundreds of hours of 
the CEO’s time and another simply noted that it was a “huge distraction.” 
Many companies described loss of management time to respond to 
discovery questions and develop a response strategy, and loss of 
engineering time to make technical workarounds. Over and over again, the 
companies and the venture capitalists talked about distraction of time and 
wasted resources. 
3. Cost Impact 
Other companies and venture capitalists underscored the impact of 
specific costs and the way in which patent demands now add to the general 
costs of doing business.92  For example, one venture capitalist noted that, 
“[m]ost of portfolio companies now need to hire an in-house general 
counsel to manage intellectual property matters, including defense against 
infringement claims. This is becoming a strategically important position to 
fill.”  
In asking the companies and venture capitalists to estimate the cost 
of defending against patent demands, the survey had listed “over $100,000” 
as the highest number. In the comments section, however, a number of the 
companies and venture capitalists described costs running into the millions 
of dollars. In the highest number cited, one startup company explained that 
it has spent $4 million in litigation expenses. A number of others simply 
referred to costs in the millions of dollars. One company reported that the 
cost of dealing with patent demands is the company’s second biggest 
expense after salary, and that it is even larger than the cost of benefits. 
Others reported diverting money to legal counsel, as well as huge amounts 
of time spent by management and by the board. As one company noted, “we 
have had to invest time researching the background of the plaintiffs, the 
patent, the claim . . . etc. internally to determine how to defend ourselves 
                                                
92 The present survey did not ask the portfolio companies themselves or the venture 
capitalists sitting on their boards about the financial scale of the portfolio companies at the 
time these patent demands were made.  Therefore, this study contains no specific analysis 
of the ratio of patent demand costs to the general costs of doing business.  
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from patent demands. . . . We expect to expend more resources as we 
engage counsel to defend ourselves from the suit. We are still at initial 
stages for our first lawsuit against an NPE.” 
4. The Human Face 
Some companies and venture capitalists described the sheer human 
toll on those who had to contend with patent assertions. 
We received a [cease and desist demand] from a patent troll 
on Christmas Eve 2011. The experience was new to us, and 
at the time, it seemed like an existential threat. It ruined my 
family’s Christmas. The troll filed a lawsuit in the spring of 
2012. The entire process lasted almost a year and completely 
distracted our company during the entire event. It took a 
huge emotional and financial toll on our small company, in 
addition to slowing down our progress. 
One startup company used the following terms to describe the 
impact on the company: “Abject fear we are being driven out of business so 
this troll can put a trophy on his wall.” In a similar vein, one venture 
capitalist spoke about the damage to employee morale.  Another company 
commented, “I consider this process to be extortion.” 
These comments echoed the narratives Professor Colleen Chien has 
reported in her interviews with a group of small technology companies that 
had received patent demands from non-practicing entities.93 Two of the 
most poignant comments from Professor Chien’s research are the following: 
It was agonizing to hand over all the money we had earned 
from a product we had invented and created ourselves to a 
firm that invents nothing and creates nothing. Our founder 
has since lost his house, car [sic] all his assets.94 
And: 
They sued my startup for infringement on a group of 
insanely broad software patents. While many much larger 
companies are fighting we do not have the resources to do 
so. It is the single most frustrating experiences [sic] I've had 
professionally. Extortion, pure and simple. The troll even 
                                                
93 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 12-14. 
94 Id at 14. 
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admitted his model was to sue everyone, get settlement 
dollars because fighting was too expensive.95 
5. Other Assorted Impacts 
Other companies and venture capitalists described the difficulties of 
managing the issue with customers, prospects and funders. One company 
noted that it had to “sell around the story as new prospects were wary of 
using the product given the litigation,” and a venture capitalist talked about 
the problem of slowing down sales “as prospective customers assess the risk 
of claims on the likelihood that the product and support will be available.” 
Another venture capitalist talked about the impact of slowing down next 
rounds of fundraising. These can be critical issues for a fledgling company, 
when every funding prospect and every customer matters in trying to gain 
traction. 
A small number of respondents noted more moderate impacts, such 
as “slightly reorganized business to reflect patent” and “moderate $ spent 
externally on legal counsel.” One company noted that so far, they have been 
able to successfully demonstrate they are not party to any of the claims. In 
addition, one venture capitalist noted that the impact can be “highly 
variable.” 
6. Weak Claims; Wasteful Process 
Many respondents expressed frustration at what they perceive to be 
the weaknesses of the claims, the wastefulness of the process, and the 
absurdity of the current process of patent demands as a whole. For example, 
one company described the following experience:  
We spent millions to settle pretty much completely spurious 
claims. The common approach that these “entities” took was: 
--make a claim--try to defend it as best they could--
eventually offer to settle by observing that it would cost us 
$3-5 million to fight it and we might lose, vs. the $2-3 
million they offer to settle initially . . . we’d work to 
negotiate them down to $1-2 million, hold our nose, and pay. 
Another noted that the patent asserted against the company was 
“broad reaching and has been poorly received [in the industry].” Yet 
another company reported that after spending $1 million on a case that went 
                                                
95 Id. 
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to litigation, the company won but did not recover anything more than court 
costs, which are typically a small amount. Numerous companies and 
venture capitalists described the claims as frivolous and no more than 
nuisance claims.   
One venture capitalist took the time to write a side letter with an 
extensive allegory of “lawn trolls.” The lawn trolls arrive in a community 
and convince all of the neighbors to negotiate over nothing more than the 
right to enjoy the view of each other’s lawns. At the end of the story, the 
neighborhood has suffered costly and distracting negotiations and incurred 
significant transaction costs, while “the troll gets rich for its foresight, 
wisdom, and creation of the market. The moral of the story, according to the 
venture capitalist, is that lawn trolls do not want fair compensation; what 
they really want is to tax everyone.  
Finally, to paraphrase one venture capitalist who summed up the 
impact of patent demands on venture-backed companies in a particularly 
cogent fashion: When companies spend money protecting their intellectual 
property position, they are not expanding; and when companies spend time 
thinking about patent demands, they are not inventing.96 
E. Is Patent Assertion Helpful or Harmful for the Venture-
Backed Community? 
A key goal of the study was to test the venture-backed community’s 
own views of whether patent assertion in their field is helpful or harmful. 
Some have suggested that patent assertion is helpful for startups and venture 
capitalists because unsuccessful companies can sell their patents to a 
monetizer if the company fails. In particular, in listing potential positive 
aspects of patent assertion entities, government officials have suggested that 
patent assertion entities, “can make it easier for a failed start-up to monetize 
its patents, providing some insurance for venture capitalists.”97 These 
arguments imply that monetization could spur venture capital investment, 
providing a benefit for the startup community. 
                                                
96 The venture capitalist’s direct quotation from the study comments is: “More spend [sic] 
to protect IP position, not necessarily expand. Thinking about trolls asserting not about 
inventing.” 
97 See Ramirez, supra note 20.  In Chien’s work, only 5% of startup companies responded 
that they have monetized their patents, with some of those explaining that they had either 
sold the patents along with a product line, sold unused patents, or licensed their patents.  
See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 18. Chien points out that many 
startups do not bother to obtain patents, particularly in the software industry, and notes, in 
addition, that companies may be embarrassed to acknowledge monetizing patents.  Id. 
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The study tested whether the venture-backed community itself sees 
patent demands as a positive. The study also examined how patent demands 
factors into venture capitalists’ decisions of whether to invest in a particular 
startup company. Respondents who had answered at the start of the survey 
that they had not received patent demands were routed directly to this last 
set of questions. 
Specifically, the survey asked venture capitalists, “how much of a 
problem are patent demands against venture-backed portfolio companies.” 
Only 6% responded that patent demands are not much of a problem at all 
for venture-backed companies. 92% of the venture capitalists responded 
that patent demands are a problem for venture-backed companies, with 
46% considering patent demands a widespread problem and 46% 
considering patent demands a limited problem. 
 
 
Interestingly, portfolio companies believe even more strongly that 
patent demands are a widespread problem. Using a variant of the venture 
capitalist question, portfolio companies were asked, “how much of a 
problem are patent demands against companies in your industry sector.” 
64% of portfolio companies responded that patent demands are a 
widespread problem in their sector, with another 20% responding that 
patent demands are a limited problem. Only 9% of portfolio companies 
responded that patent demands are not much of a problem at all.  
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 Perhaps one of the most telling set of responses, however, came 
from asking the venture capitalists how patent demands play into their 
funding decisions. 65% of the venture capitalists disagreed with the 
statement, “[a]s a venture capitalist, in making funding decisions, I 
consider the potential for selling patents to patent assertion entities if the 
companies fail.” Only 18% agreed. The largest group of responses came 
from those who not only disagreed, but disagreed strongly—constituting 
41% of respondents. 
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Similarly, when the venture capitalists were asked whether they see 
“patent assertion as positive for startups and the startup community,” 72% 
either disagreed or disagreed strongly. Again, the largest group of 
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These results are consistent with comments I heard from venture 
capitalists as I was designing the survey. As one venture capitalist noted, 
“VCs swing for the fences; they are not interested in pennies on the dollar.” 
The results are also consistent with Chien’s findings in her 
interviews of venture capitalists. 78% of the venture capitalists disagreed 
that the ability of companies to monetize their patents through 
“NPEs/’Trolls’” helped innovation; 83% agreed that NPEs/Trolls are 
hurting innovation.98  
The most striking results, however, came in response to the question 
of whether the venture capitalists would “refrain from investing in a new 
company that had an existing patent demand.” Not a single respondent 
chose the answer, “no, it is not a factor.” Rather, 100% of venture 
capitalists indicated that if a company had an existing patent demand 
against it, it could potentially be a deterrent in deciding whether to invest. 
Roughly half indicated that it would be a major deterrent on its face, and the 





In short, the venture-backed company community overwhelmingly 
views patent demands as a negative for their industry, does not think about 
the potential for reselling patents when deciding whether to invest in a 
                                                
98 See Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, supra note 10, at 21. 
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company, and would pause before investing in a company that had an 
existing patent demand against it. Thus, the notion that patent assertion is 
helpful for the venture capital community is contradicted by the community 
itself in this study. 
III. CONCLUSION 
The results of surveying 200 venture capitalists and their portfolio 
companies provide strong indications of the impact that patent demands are 
having on the venture-backed community. Both the companies and the 
venture capitalists overwhelming believe that patent demands have a 
negative impact on the venture-backed community, with all or most of those 
assertions coming from entities whose core activity involves licensing or 
litigating patents. These impacts are described in terms of the specific costs 
expended by the companies and by the distraction to management, 
engineers, and other employees.  Most important, participants described the 
human toll that patent demands have had on entrepreneurs. In addition, 
when making funding decisions, the vast majority of venture capitalists do 
not consider the potential for selling to assertion entities if the company 
fails. On the flip side, 100% of venture capitalists indicated that if a 
company had an existing patent demand against it, it could be a deterrent in 
deciding whether to invest. 
Finally, one venture capitalist provided an excellent summary of the 
impact of patent demands on venture-backed companies. When companies 
spend money trying to protect their intellectual property position, they are 
not expanding; and when companies spend time thinking about patent 
demands, they are not inventing. 
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APPENDIX 
Location of Company Headquarters for Portfolio Company Respondents 
# Answer   
 
 % 
1 Alabama   
 
 1% 
2 Alaska   
 
 0% 
3 Arizona   
 
 0% 













7 Colorado   
 
 7% 
8 Connecticut   
 
 0% 
9 Delaware   
 
 3% 





11 Florida   
 
 0% 
12 Georgia   
 
 0% 
13 Hawaii   
 
 1% 
14 Idaho   
 
 1% 
15 Illinois   
 
 13% 
16 Indiana   
 
 0% 
17 Iowa   
 
 1% 
18 Kansas   
 
 0% 
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20 Louisiana   
 
 0% 
21 Maine   
 
 0% 
22 Maryland   
 
 3% 
23 Massachusetts   
 
 11% 
24 Michigan   
 
 1% 
25 Minnesota   
 
 1% 
26 Mississippi   
 
 0% 
27 Missouri   
 
 0% 
28 Montana   
 
 0% 
29 Nebraska   
 
 0% 








32 New Jersey   
 
 1% 
33 New Mexico   
 
 0% 








36 North Dakota   
 
 0% 
37 Ohio   
 
 0% 
38 Oklahoma   
 
 0% 
39 Oregon   
 
 1% 




Yale Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 16 [2014], Iss. 2, Art. 1
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjolt/vol16/iss2/1
 PATENT DEMANDS & STARTUP COMPANIES 
284 








43 South Dakota   
 
 0% 
44 Tennessee   
 
 0% 
45 Texas   
 
 7% 
46 Utah   
 
 0% 
47 Vermont   
 
 0% 
48 Virginia   
 
 2% 
49 Washington   
 
 2% 
50 West Virginia   
 
 0% 
51 Wisconsin   
 
 4% 
52 Wyoming   
 
 0% 
 Total  15 100% 
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